Global Comment

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What Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal really means

Brexit

Boris Johnson has got a Brexit deal! After weeks of frantic speculation about whether or not we would crash out of Europe on the 31st October without a deal, this has been a somewhat unexpected occurrence. But is it a cause for hope?

The answer to that question is: probably not, and it’s complicated.

What Boris Johnson has achieved with European negotiators is a deal that both sides are happy with. But just because Johnson and the negotiators are happy does not mean that everybody is. Even ardent Brexiteers are wary. And Leavers who are desperate to remain in the EU are certainly not impressed.

Many Northern Irelanders, too, are displeased. Northern Ireland is a complex place with a history of unrest and violence during the Troubles, when there were bombs and shootings and all kinds of violence between those Northern Irelanders who wanted to be considered British and those who wanted to be considered Irish. The Good Friday agreement, reached after much hard work by the inimitable Mo Mowlam and her team, brought a careful and tentative ceasefire.

One key to the success of the Good Friday Agreement was the idea that those in Northern Ireland could choose whether or not they identified as British, Irish, or both. It was important that people could choose the identity they related to and live their lives accordingly. And this is why Northern Ireland has been so key in the Brexit negotiations: the Republic of Ireland is an EU member. If Northern Ireland was to leave the EU, then border checks would have to be put up so that goods could be tracked across the border.

A border between the Republic and the North would put the Good Friday agreement at stake, because it would put a border between people in the south and those in the North who identify as Irish.

Instead, Johnson’s deal has put the border between Northern Ireland and mainland Britain. This resolves one problem but creates a new one: there will be a border between the Brits in Northern Ireland and the Brits in mainland Britain.

Any border, whether between North and south or between North and mainland Britain puts some Northern Irelanders in a situation where they have a barrier between them and those they consider to be people of the same nationality.

What happens next?

The British Parliament will sit on Saturday this week, the first time it has sat on a Saturday since the invasion of the Falkland Islands. The purpose of this will be to get MPs to debate and then vote on this new deal from Johnson. If MPs accept the deal as he has negotiated it, it will become law. If it doesn’t, then Johnson’s campaign promise to leave the EU on 31st October – no ifs, no buts, remember – will look even less likely.

The Labour Party is set to oppose voting this deal into law. They don’t think it’s good enough and they want a public referendum, a people’s vote, on any deal. Johnson’s deal failing could also provoke him to call again for a General Election, which the Labour Party has been resisting but ultimately will want.

After Johnson dismissed colleagues from his party for voting against him, he no longer has a majority in Parliament so cannot simply impose the whip on all his MPs and expect the bill to pass by default. The Scottish National Party (SNP) has been extremely vocal against any Brexit plans so will also vote against the bill, and the Lib Dems (somewhat swollen recently, having absorbed some of the expelled Tories into their ranks) are keen to revoke Article 50, cancelling Brexit altogether, so will certainly not vote for a way to leave neatly.

However, the DUP, rebel independent MPs and some pro-Leave Labour MPs may vote in Johnson’s favour.

If the deal is passed, there will be a period of transition in which the UK will be able to (try to) create trading agreements with countries that have dealt with us because we were in the EU before. We will get nowhere near the kind of favourable agreements that a massive entity like the EU can demand, as we are a small country that is – frankly – the desperate party in this scenario. We need other countries more than they need us and this desperation gives us a disadvantage, both when negotiating Brexit itself, and negotiating any trade deals and relationships afterwards.

Image credit: Christoph Scholz