Relations between Russia and Kazakhstan continue to fracture. Moscow’s crucial ally in both the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization seems to be attempting to distance itself from the Kremlin.
Even before Russia launched its so-called special military operation in Ukraine, the Kazakh authorities openly said that they did not intend to recognize the Moscow-backed self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic. More importantly, Nur-Sultan refused to side with the Kremlin on March 2 when the United Nations General Assembly voted on a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of the Eastern European country. And that was the beginning of Kazakhstan’s gradual “de-coupling” from Russia.
Ever since, relations between Moscow and Nur-Sultan have gone from bad to worse. Nominally, the two countries are political and military allies. In reality, however, Kazakhstan seems to be attempting to preserve its “multi-vector” foreign policy, which did not seem to be an obstacle for the Russo-Kazakh ties in the past. But now that Moscow is isolated in the international arena, the Kremlin is unlikely to continue to tolerate Kazakhstan’s “neutrality” regarding the Ukraine war.
From the Russian perspective, the international recognition of the Donbass republics would, at least to a certain extent, legitimize its actions in Ukraine. There is no doubt that Moscow would want Kazakhstan, Belarus, as well as other Russian allies, to follow Syria’s path and officially recognize the two self-proclaimed entities. Kazakhstan, however, remains firm in its support to Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
“If the right to self-determination is put into practice worldwide, then there will be over 600 countries instead of the 193 states which are currently members of the United Nations. For this reason, we do not recognize either Taiwan, or Kosovo, or South Ossetia, or Abkhazia. This principle will also be applied to quasi-state territories, which, in our opinion, are Lugansk and Donetsk”, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev told his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin at the plenary session of the 25th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 20.
The Kremlin did not seem happy about Tokayev’s remarks. On July 5, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which takes oil from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea via one of the world’s largest pipelines, has been told by a Russian court to suspend activity for 30 days. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium operates a key oil export line that runs from the Atyrau region in Kazakhstan to an offshore terminal near the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The pipeline carries over 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s total oil exports. Given that Tokayev, on July 4, pledged to assist the European Union in stabilizing the global energy market, it is entirely possible that the Russian court’s decision was Moscow’s response to both Tokayev’s statement about the Donbass, as well as his ambition to increase energy supplies to the EU.
Still, on July 11, the regional court of the Russian city of Krasnodar lifted suspension on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and replaced it with a 200,000 roubles fine (US$3,300). In other words, the Kremlin either made a behind-the-scenes deal with Nur-Sultan, or it was simply pressured by the West to allow a free flow of Kazakh oil to Europe.
As a result of the tensions between the two neighbors, the energy-rich Central Asian nation, which annually supplies 67 million tons of oil through Russia to Europe, started actively seeking to diversify its oil supply routes. Kazakhstan now plans to reduce its dependence on the Russian Federation as a transit country. Nur-Sultan is reportedly also aiming to build a fleet of shuttle tankers that would deliver oil to Azerbaijan, and from there through Georgia and Turkey to Europe. According to Tokayev, the priority direction for oil diversification is the Trans-Caspian route. But it is a long-term strategy. A rapid diversification of export routes is unlikely to be possible under the current geopolitical circumstances.
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan is expected to continue distancing itself from the Kremlin. The Central Asian nation has already made it perfectly clear that it will not help Moscow evade sanctions that the West has imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. In addition, Nur-Sultan is reportedly preparing to ban the transport of goods to Russia and Belarus that have been sanctioned by the European Union, Great Britain and the United States. Such a move will likely have an additional impact on relations between Nur-Sultan and Moscow.
In order to ease tensions, Kazakh Presidential Spokesperson Ruslan Zheldibai pointed out that Russia was and will remain his country’s ally and strategic partner, emphasizing that Nur-Sultan “will not take any actions that affect Russia’s interests”. At the same time, according to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tleuberdi, the former Soviet republic is “working on a new stage in the relations with the United States”. In other words, Nur-Sultan aims to continue pursuing its “multi-vector” diplomacy, although a new geopolitical reality may force it to eventually “pick a side” in a new Cold War.
For the foreseeable future, low-scale political and economic tensions between Moscow and its Central Asian ally are expected to grow, since Moscow will likely aim to preserve Kazakhstan in its zone of influence. It remains to be seen if the energy-rich country will be able to continue balancing between Russia and the West, as the Kremlin becomes more aggressive in its relations with its immediate neighbors.
Image: Alex J. Butler