Unlike Ukraine, which will never recognize any documents issued by the Russia-backed self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic, Serbia has, on August 27, recognized IDs issued by the United States-sponsored self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo. Belgrade’s decision has paved the way for Serbian de jure recognition of its breakaway province, a move that may come in the foreseeable future.
It is no secret that Washington expects Belgrade and Pristina to reach an agreement that includes mutual recognition. From Serbia’s perspective, it is completely irrelevant if the southeastern European country is recognized by Kosovo or not. But from the perspective of the authorities in Pristina, Serbian recognition of Kosovo would mean that Belgrade has permanently given up on its ambitions to eventually restore its sovereignty over the territory it still sees as the Serbian southern province.
Quite aware of that, the West has been pushing Belgrade for decades to normalize relations with Pristina. As a result, Serbia has been gradually relinquishing much of its authority in Kosovo in favor of the Albanian-dominated authorities in Pristina. Presently, Serbia effectively controls the education and health systems in its southern province, but only in those places where the Serbs make up the majority of the population. Over the years, Belgrade, pressured by the West, has been forcing the Serbs to integrate into Kosovo’s institutions. The US and its allies, therefore, expected Serbia to make another concession and pressure the Serbs living in northern Kosovo to replace their Serbian-issued license plates and IDs with Kosovan ones.
The Serbs, however, do not see Kosovo as an independent state, and many of them refuse to integrate into Kosovo’s legal system. Northern Kosovo, where the Serbs make up the majority of population, remains a “gray zone” where neither Belgrade nor Pristina have full sovereignty. Given that the Serbs threatened to raise barricades in case Pristina attempts to force them to use Kosovo-issued license plates, NATO – deployed to Kosovo as a result of the 1999 war – said it was ready to increase its presence in the region. In the end, despite apocalyptic announcements, situation in northern Kosovo remained calm, as Belgrade and Pristina reached a deal, brokered by the European Union.
The Serbs living in northern Kosovo will continue using their Serbian-issued documents, while Albanians will be allowed to travel to Serbia with Kosovo-issued IDs. In other words, Serbia has de facto recognized identity cards issued by the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, while Pristina has agreed to preserve status quo in the north.
That, however, does not mean the end of disputes between Belgrade and Pristina. Sooner or later, the Serbs in northern Kosovo will be pressured, one way or another, to fully integrate into Kosovo’s legal system. Given that Belgrade’s room for political maneuvers is rather limited, the Balkan nation is expected to continue making concessions to Pristina. For now, Serbia will preserve control over the education and health systems in Serbian-majority places in Kosovo, but in the foreseeable future Belgrade will likely hand over its authority not directly to Pristina, but to the Community of Serb Municipalities – a planned self-governing association of municipalities with a Serb majority population in Kosovo. After that, the West is expected to strongly pressure Serbia to formally recognize Kosovo.
Given that Kosovo has not been recognized by five EU members – Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus – Serbia still does not have to yield to pressure that comes from the bloc. But after Brussels abolishes the veto power in the European Union’s foreign policy, and moves to qualified majority voting, Serbia will unlikely be able to count on support from those EU countries that still support its territorial integrity. What Belgrade can do is to attempt to improve relations with the United States – major foreign power operating in the Balkans – hoping to revive the idea of a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo. However, it is extremely improbable that the Biden administration will ever support such plans, which means that Belgrade will eventually find itself under tremendous pressure to recognize secession of its own territory.
“We are now in a problem because the West will call on Serbia to head quickly towards recognizing Kosovo so that they can tell Russian President Vladimir Putin that the Donbass and Kosovo are not about the same issue”, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said in May.
From the Western perspective, the Kosovo case is sui generis, although in reality there is no much difference between Pristina’s unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo in 2008 – recognized by most Western countries – and Russia’s decision to recognize the self-proclaimed Donbass republics. The West will, however, continue supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and at the same time demanding Serbia to recognize secession of its own territory.
In international relations, might makes right. Given that Ukraine’s opponent has proved to be extremely weak, and Kyiv is firmly baked by NATO – the strongest military Alliance in history – the Eastern European country, unlike Serbia, will never have to make any concessions to its separatist regions. Quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi.
Image: qiv
