While Russia remains busy invading Ukraine, the European Union seems to be gradually replacing Moscow as the key meditator between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is Brussels, rather than the Kremlin, that could have the last say in the decades-old disputes between the two archenemies.
In the past, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders used to go to Russia whenever the situation in the turbulent South Caucasus region escalated. Now that Moscow is preoccupied with its military adventure in Ukraine, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev started holding regular meetings in Brussels under the auspices of the European Union.
Following Pashinyan’s April visit to Moscow, and prior to the summit held in Brussels on May 22, Armenia announced a six-point proposal to normalize relations with Azerbaijan. The document was Yerevan’s response to Baku’s five-point plan announced in March. The Armenian proposal primarily states that the country “has no territorial claims to Azerbaijan”. In 2020, the two nations fought a war over the Nagorno-Karabah region – internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, although it had been occupied by Armenian forces for more than two decades. As a result of the conflict, Baku restored its sovereignty over most parts of the region, as well as surrounding areas.
As the defeated party, Armenia now does not have much choice but to make painful concessions to Azerbaijan. Still, Yerevan reportedly aims to preserve a de facto control over certain parts of Nagorno-Karabakh. In November 2020, as a result of the ceasefire agreement signed in Moscow, Russia deployed some 2,000 troops to the region, and they are stationed mostly in areas inhabited by ethnic Armenians. According to Yerevan’s proposal, guaranteeing the security and respecting the rights and freedoms of the Armenians of Artsakh (the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh) and determining the final status of Artsakh are fundamental for Armenia. Such an idea, however, contradicts Alyiev’s claims that the conflict in the region is over, and that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh has already been resolved.
Given that Baku, as the clear winner of the 44-day war, has the upper hand over Yerevan – especially now that Armenia’s nominal ally, Russia, does not play the role of the major arbiter – it is extremely unlikely that Azerbaijan will agree to negotiate the status of the mountainous region.
Baku, for its part, insists on the demarcation of the borders between the two countries, as well as on the construction of the Nakhchivan corridor, also known as the Zangezur corridor. The future road will allow Azerbaijan to have a land connection with its exclave – the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. At the same time, it will connect Azerbaijan with its ally Turkey. The problem, however, is that 45 kilometers of the corridor must go through the Armenian territory. Yerevan, unlike Baku, does not seem to be in a hurry with the construction, even though the railroad will connect Armenia with its ally Russia through Azerbaijan’s mainland.
Although in January 2021, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia signed a deal on the development of the infrastructure in the region, reports suggest that Yerevan is making very little progress in the construction of its section of the Nakhchivan corridor. Instead, Armenia aims to build the North-South Corridor, which would connect the country with Russia through Georgia. The corridor would also additionally connect the landlocked Caucasus nation with neighboring Iran, which is why the Islamic Republic is interested in the construction of the project.
Turkey, on the other hand, seems to pressure Yerevan to respond to “Azerbaijan’s well-intentioned approaches”, even though in November 2021 Pashinyan stressed that “Armenia does not want to discuss the Nakhchivan corridor with Ankara”. Yerevan, however, reportedly seeks to normalize relations with Turkey, while certain opposition parties, as well as nationalist forces firmly oppose such an idea. They accuse Pashinyan of mishandling negotiations with Azerbaijan, and continue to hold anti-government protests in Yerevan. However, it may well turn out that Pashinyan’s government is a beneficiary of the ongoing demonstrations, since it could provide an excuse for delaying the practical implementation of the deals with Baku, namely Armenia’s recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan.
Some Azerbaijani authors claim that it is the Kremlin that prevents Armenia from normalizing ties with its neighbors. Moscow, for its part, hopes to preserve its role of a regional arbiter, which is why the Russian Foreign Ministry “does not rule out” a new meeting between Pashinyan, Aliyev, and the Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Indeed, if Armenia and Azerbaijan eventually sign a peace treaty in Brussels, rather than in Moscow, Russia will undoubtedly face another geopolitical defeat. More importantly, if the Kremlin does not consolidate its positions in the South Caucasus, it is rather questionable if Russian troops will stay in the region after 2025, which is when their five-year mandate expires.
Thus, it is entirely possible that Moscow will attempt to pressure Armenia not to sign any agreements with Azerbaijan, or at least to drag out negotiations until Russia ends its so-called special military operation in Ukraine.
Image: president.az
