For the Kremlin, both liberal opposition and Russian nationalists seem to represent an equal threat. In order to eliminate any competition and portray Vladimir Putin as a “moderate leader”, Russia’s ruling elite has started brutally suppressing any kind of criticism of the way the country’s Defense Ministry conducts the so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine.
Quite aware that, one month after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny, Putin is still at risk of losing his grip on power, the Kremlin began arresting potential dissidents. On June 29, Russian General Sergei Surovikin has reportedly been arrested, even though he publicly condemned Prigozhin’s actions. But given Surovikin’s close ties with the Wagner Group’s leader, Putin likely did not want to risk another rebellion, which is why “General Armageddon” – if reports are true – ended up behind bars.
A few weeks later, on July 17, Russian authorities accused the former intelligence officer Vladimir Kvachkov of “discrediting the Russian army”. Kvachkov already spent many years in jail for an alleged attempt to assassinate Anatoly Chubais – an influential member of Boris Yeltsin’s administration in the early 1990s. Following his release from prison in 2019, Kvachkov established close ties with Igor Girkin, also known as Igor Strelkov – a charismatic former FSB colonel who is believed to have started the war in the Donbass in 2014.
After he was forced to leave the Donbass in the summer of 2014, Girkin started criticizing various Russian officials, although not Putin himself. However, following a series of debacles that Russia suffered in Ukraine in 2022, Strelkov became an open critic of Vladimir Putin. For a long time, the Kremlin tolerated his attacks on Putin, as well as on Russia’s top defense officials – Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. But after Prigozhin’s aborted mutiny clearly demonstrated the weakness of the Russian regime, Putin and his inner circle did not seem to have much choice but to start eliminating potential political opponents.
Previously, one year before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the authorities in Moscow arrested the Kremlin critic Alexey Navalny, who is often portrayed as one of the leaders of the Russian liberal opposition. Could it be that the Russian elite back then was preparing the ground for the war in Ukraine by removing any anti-war figures from the political scene?
Coincidently enough, in 2017, Navalny and Strelkov took part in a debate in which they both criticized the Kremlin, although from completely different perspectives. While Navalny focused on corruption, Girkin accused Moscow of taking a soft approach regarding Ukraine. Now both figures are behind bars. Strelkov was arrested on July 21, on charges of extremism, following his harsh rhetoric against Putin.
“For 23 years, the country was led by a lowlife who managed to ‘blow dust in the eyes’ of a significant part of the population”, Strelkov wrote on his Telegram channel, emphasizing that “Russia will not be able to withstand another six years of this cowardly bum in power.”
Indeed, following Prigozhin’s actions on June 24, the authorities in Russia have become too sensitive to any criticism. However, the fact that not a single Wagner commander faced trial, and that Prigozhin continues doing business in Russia, clearly suggest that the Wagner Group frontman, unlike Girkin, is still backed by certain structures within the Kremlin. Strelkov, on the other hand, was never part of the Russian political mainstream, even though he emerged into the international spotlight in 2014 when he became the first defense minister of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic.
The role also made him the prime suspect in the Dutch investigation into the downing of flight MH17, which crashed in July 2014, killing all 298 people on board. For the West and Ukraine, he is a war criminal who not only started the war in the Donbass, but is also responsible for causing the MH17 crash. For some Russian nationalists, he is a hero of the so-called Russian Spring in 2014, and a man who fights for the motherland. For the Kremlin, he is simply a dangerous element who could eventually mobilize Russian “angry patriots”, and possibly play an important role in a potential large-scale civil unrest that Russia can face if it suffers a defeat in Ukraine.
In order to prevent such a scenario, the Kremlin has put Strelkov in the Lefortovo Prison in Moscow. His close associate, Pavel Gubarev, is reportedly also under investigation for extremism, which means that Prigozhin’s mutiny has triggered a broader crackdown on the Russian ultranationalists. In other words, if the nationalists are “extremists”, and the liberals are “traitors” and “foreign agents”, pro-Kremlin propagandists have enough room to portray Putin as a “moderate” leader. More importantly, now that the opposition – be it a nationalist or a liberal one – is de facto eliminated, Putin can optionally play the role of both “hawk” and “peacemaker”. He will also undoubtedly increase his PR campaign, aiming to create an illusion that he is still loved by most Russians.
Meanwhile, Strelkov, Navalny, as well as many other political prisoners, will rot in their cells, where they will be forced to watch Russian federal TV channels showing videos of Putin kissing children, riding bears, saving people from wild Siberian tigers, and taking selfies with his fans. But sooner or later, the Russian population will have to face reality: Putin’s adventure in Ukraine will have an enormous impact on their lives. In the end, Russian liberals and nationalist may join forces to overthrow the country’s leader who is already equally despised by both groups.
Image: Colonel Kvachkov in 2019 by AlexChirkin
