Energy-rich Kazakhstan is one of Russia’s most important allies. The Central Asian nation, however, has closer ties with the West than any other country in the region. Is Russia’s influence in Nur-Sultan fading?
Kazakhstan is a member of the Russia-dominated Eurasian Union, as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Unlike most other CSTO members, Nur-Sultan takes part in various NATO activities, which is why Moscow reportedly fears that its ally could host the US military base now that the American troops have finally withdrawn from Afghanistan.
Back in June, the US Special Representative for Reconciliation in Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, visited Almaty and met with Kazakh officials, but refused to directly say if the Washington plans to set up military bases in Central Asia. However, on September 13, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Defense Murat Bektanov hosted the head of the Central Command of the US Armed Forces (CENTCOM), General Kenneth Mackenzie, which could indicate that the US is eyeing up Kazakhstan as a location for its military facilities. CENTCOM’s area of responsibility covers 21 countries, including Russia’s allies in Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Rumors are flying that the Pentagon wants the airfield-hub in Almaty as an airbase for reconnaissance and military transport aviation. The Almaty International Airport no longer belongs to Kazakhstan, given that the majority of shares of this facility were sold to the Turkish company TAV Airports Holding. Still, Nur-Sultan has the last say in a potential military deal with the United States. At this point, Kazakhstan seems to be attempting to balance between Moscow and Washington, although it is still heavily in the Russian geopolitical orbit. However, on September 14 in Nur Sultan, a conference of the chiefs of general staffs of Central and South Asia countries was held and, according to reports, representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, United States, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan discussed the security situation in the region, including the turmoil in Afghanistan. Russia did not have a seat at the table.
Nevertheless, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was in Kazakhstan on October 12, and he met with the country’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. They discussed regional security issues, including international efforts to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. The Kremlin reportedly fears that instability in Afghanistan could spread to Central Asia, which would have a negative impact on the Russian Federation and could potentially undermine its role in the region. Also, if regional countries eventually increase their economic ties with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, and focus on building strategically important infrastructure project, Russia could lose its grip in Central Asia.
In order to prevent such a scenario, the Kremlin will likely tend to increase its presence in the region, particularly in Kazakhstan, the richest and the largest country in Central Asia. Recently, Moscow and Nur-Sultan recently signed 13 documents that aim to strengthen economic ties between the two allied nations. In addition, Kazakhstan could soon hand over part of its “digital sovereignty” to Russia, although some reports suggest that Nur Sultan is trying to reduce Russian cultural influence in the country. For instance, the so-called language patrols began in Kazakhstan in August, demanding to be served by people speaking the Kazakh language instead of Russian. Also, Kazakhstan’s transition from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet is expected to begin in 2023, which could be interpreted as another step in a gradual “de-Russification” of the country.
“We must prepare for external shocks and worst-case scenarios”, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev recently warned, point out that “modelling of risks coming from the outside has become highly relevant”.
Since Kazakhstan does not border Afghanistan, it is not very probable that a potential civil war between the Taliban and its opponents, or a possible Taliban incursion into neighboring Tajikistan, could destabilize the authorities in Nur-Sultan. Thus, it is more likely that the Kazakh leader is worried about Russia’s role in his country, given that there is speculation that Moscow could eventually capture northern Kazakhstan. As some analysts suggest, the Kremlin is finding it increasingly difficult to keep the Central Asian giant in its orbit, especially since the European Union and the United States account for two-thirds of direct investment in the country.
All that, however, does not mean that Russia is interesting in a “land grab”, especially since the two largest petroleum liquids fields and natural gas fields, Karachaganak and Tengiz, are not located in North Kazakhstan, where ethnic Russians make up 50 percent of the population. It is worth noting that Russia’s oil company Lukoil, together with Rosneft corporation, has been responsible for exploring the Tengiz oil and gas field, which ranks as the world’s deepest supergiant oil field. Lukoil is also expected to help develop other oil fields in Kazakhstan’s portion of the Caspian Sea. Moreover, Russia’s state-controlled oil company Zarubezhneft is in talks with the authorities of Kazakhstan about joint projects for the development of onshore gas fields, and Moscow and Nur-Sultan could soon engage into a construction of a nuclear power plant in the Central Asian nation.
Finally, as long as the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk remains the primary outlet for Kazakh fossil fuels, the Kremlin will have a mechanism to preserve the former Soviet republic in the Russian sphere of influence, at least in terms of energy. After all, energy is one the key pillars of Russian foreign policy.
Image credit: United States Mission Geneva