The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) seems to exist solely on paper. In reality, with the exception of Belarus, not a single CSTO member supports Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the Kremlin seems to be having a hard time preserving some of its nominal allies in its geopolitical orbit.
Although in January 2022 the Russian-dominated CSTO (whose members are Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia) helped the authorities in Astana to crackdown on large-scale violent protests, the Central Asian nation now seems to be attempting to distance itself from the Kremlin. On 3 January 2024, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said that, during mass riots, he officially appealed to CSTO for the deployment of a peacekeeping contingent to restore stability and ensure security, emphasizing that his request “was not made to Russia specifically”.
Tokayev’s statement could be interpreted as Astana’s ambition to reshape its foreign policy, which means that – despite its membership in the CSTO – Kazakhstan no longer sees Russia as its major ally. That, however, does not mean that the Central Asian state will leave the alliance, although the Kremlin is unlikely to be able to count on Astana’s direct assistance in the Ukraine war.
It is not a secret that Kazakhstan provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and even restricted the export of goods to Russia that can be used for military purposes. More importantly, despite frequent Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s Belgorod region, as well as on other oblasts in Western Russia – moves that could be interpreted as Kyiv’s retaliation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine – neither Kazakhstan, nor the CSTO, ever reacted.
According to Article 4 of the CSTO Treaty, “an act of aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty) against one of the member states will be considered as a collective act of aggression on all member states of the CSTO”.
Thus, given that Russia’s nominal allies continue turning a blind eye to Ukrainian actions, the CSTO’s very raison d’etre has become rather questionable.
Prior to the organization’s summit held in Belarusian capital Minsk on 23 November 2023, it became obvious that Armenia does not see its future in the alliance. The landlocked South Caucasus nation’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan refused to travel to Belarus, citing his government’s dissatisfaction with the organization. Armenia has previously canceled joint CSTO drills in October, while in November 2022 Pashinyan did not sign a draft declaration of the CSTO summit in Yerevan.
Relations between Armenia and Russia have significantly deteriorated after the defeat of ethnic Armenians by Azerbaijan in the military conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. In May 2021, Yerevan accused Azerbaijani troops of entering Armenian territory aiming to “lay siege” to Lake Sev Lich (Black Lake), which both countries border. Although Armenian authorities officially applied to both Russia and CSTO for help, the Kremlin and the Russian-led military bloc remained silent.
Ever since, Armenia has been trying to strengthen its military, political, and economic ties with the West. Pashinyan has openly stated that Yerevan is looking for “new security partners”. Indeed, the former Soviet republic aims to establish close military cooperation with the United States, and has already started purchasing weapons from NATO member France, as well as from India.
The Kremlin, on the other hand, indirectly accuses Yerevan of selling weapons to Ukraine, which is something that Armenia’s Defense Ministry strongly denies. However, if relations between Moscow and Yerevan continue to deteriorate, and Armenia eventually leaves CSTO, it is entirely possible that the South Caucasus state will start openly supporting Ukraine. For now, Moscow will almost certainly continue struggling to keep (at least formally) Armenia in its orbit, and also to increase its positions in Central Asia – a region that has a significant strategic importance not only for Russia, but also for its frenemy Turkey.
Still, the fact that neither Yerevan nor any other Russian ally (excluding Belarus) has ever supported Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, perfectly suggests that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims about CSTO joint activities “facilitating unity among its countries and people” hardly represent anything more than empty rhetoric. Therefore, given current Armenia’s geopolitical course, it is questionable if Moscow, in the long-term, will manage to preserve its military presence (Russian 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, and the 3624th Airbase in Erebuni Airport near Yerevan) in the landlocked country of around 2,8 million people.
For the foreseeable future, however, the Kremlin is expected to continue using the CSTO as an instrument that could allow it to (at least to a certain extent) improve its positions in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and preserve remnants of its influence in Kazakhstan. But the outcome of Putin’s adventure in Ukraine will undoubtedly have an impact on the three Central Asian states’ foreign policy and security vectors.
Image: Kassym-Jomart Tokayev by Majilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan
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