While the world’s eyes turn towards Ukraine, Azerbaijan is taking full advantage in the South Caucasus. Quite aware that Russia is not in a position to intervene and protect its ally Armenia, the energy-rich nation is attempting to establish control over portions of Nagorno-Karabakh that are still under Armenian control.
On March 25, following clashes between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces in the mountainous region, Azerbaijan established control over the village of Farrukh, which had been under the protection of the Russian peacekeeping force since November 2020. The Kremlin accused Baku of violating a ceasefire deal that had effectively ended the 44-day war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the fall of 2020. Russia claims Azerbaijan carried out four drone strikes on Armenian military units in the area, and urged Baku to pull back troops.
On March 27, Moscow said Azerbaijan withdrew its forces from the village, which is something that both Baku and Yerevan denied. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense requested that Russia “completely withdraw the remnants of the Armenian army” from the Azeri territory. In other words, the Kremlin’s role as a mediator in the conflict between the two Caucasus neighbors seems to be dead. Preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, and isolated from the West, Russia does not have a mechanism to prevent another conflict in the turbulent region.
Nominally, Russia is an ally of both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Yerevan has been a member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) since 1994, while Russian President Vladimir Putin and Azerbaijan’s leader Ilham Aliyev signed an “allied cooperation agreement” on 22 February 2022, just two days before Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. Still, given the new geopolitical reality, Azerbaijan is trying to benefit from Russia’s weakened position in the international arena and restore its sovereignty over the territory that is still controlled by the Armenia-backed self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh.
According to reports, Russian peacekeeping mission has sent some of its reserves to “block the further movement of the Azerbaijani army”. As a result of the 44-day war, 2,000 Russian peacekeepers have been deployed to the region, but they are unlikely to prevent another round of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. Under the current circumstances, they are being held hostage by Putin’s military adventure in Ukraine. With no direct land link with Russia, their supply chains depend heavily on Azerbaijan. The energy-rich nation, on the other hand, is dependent on the import of various goods from the Russian Federation, which is why Baku is not interested in a radical deterioration of relations with the Kremlin.
Ukraine, however, reportedly hopes that Azerbaijan could open a “second front” in Nagorno-Karabakh, which would help the Eastern European nation launch a counter offensive against Russian forces in several Ukrainian regions. At this point, however, whether Baku is determined to raise the stakes remains highly uncertain, despite Russia’s weakened position in the Caucasus.
Armenia, as a defeated country, is not expected to fight another war against Azerbaijan – a nation that is firmly backed by NATO-member Turkey. In the event of a potential offensive by Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, Yerevan will be unlikely to be able to help its proxy forces the region. Indeed, Armenia would be the biggest loser in a new war, although a potential conflict would additionally reduce Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus.
Russia’s poor military performances in Ukraine have shown that its army is not as strong as previously believed. That is why Azerbaijan is not hesitating to take advantage of Putin’s war in the Eastern European country, and aims to achieve at least some of its military goals. Capturing Farrukh is just the first step in that direction.
Meanwhile, Baku will continue implementing its regional agenda – connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Although the 2020 ceasefire deal states that “all economic and transport links in the region shall be unblocked”, to this day Armenia refuses to build its section of the Nakhchivan Corridor, quite aware that such a move would deprave Yerevan the last trump-card it has against Baku. That is why Azerbaijan recently signed a transport deal with Iran bypassing Armenia. The corridor, linking Azerbaijan mainland with Nakhchivan through Iran, is also expected to become part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and offer Beijing a second route to Europe in the South Caucasus.
Armenia’s position in this geopolitical game is already particularly difficult. Yerevan’s nominal ally Russia is also an ally of its archenemy Azerbaijan, and its southern neighbor Iran will likely allow Baku to have a land link to Nakhchivan. At the same time, without the Nakhchivan Corridor, Armenia will not have rail and road connections with Russia and will remain “surrounded by enemies”.
Indeed, at this point, the last thing Armenia needs is another war. But the landlocked country could easily become a “collateral damage” of the Russian debacle in Ukraine.
Image credit: President.az
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