Thailand’s on the brink of something – but what?

The conflict in Thailand has intensified in recent days. On May 13, Major General Khattiya Sawatdiphol, also known as Seh Daeng, the highest ranking Thai general to support the protestors, was shot in the head while giving a television interview. He died on Monday.

On May 14, the Thai military cordoned off the zone in central Bangkok where the protestors, known as red shirts, and began a violent crackdown. At the time of writing, at least 37 people have died in the last four days.

The western image of Thailand is one of white beaches, tropical paradise, wonderful food, and, unfortunately, sex tourism. While Thailand is all of this, it is also a nation torn by deep political, class, and ethnic divides that have intensified in the last five years.

The present conflict began in 2006 when the military overthrew Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in a bloodless coup. The military accused Thaksin of widespread corruption and claimed the coup, executed when Thaksin was out of the country, was necessary to save the nation from becoming his fiefdom.

There is little doubt about Thaksin’s corruption. Estimates of his wealth surpass $2 billion. And while Thaksin’s financial dealings are regrettable, to say the least, that’s not the real reason the military overthrew him. Corruption is endemic in Thai politics, perpetrated by most big political players, including coup supporters.

The 2006 coup took place because Thaksin’s policies to empower the millions of Thai rural poor angered Bangkok elites. His administration drastically cut rural poverty and instituted the nation’s first universal health care program. This made Thaksin a hero among the poor and created an enduring political base for his party.

While Thaksin might have used his political support as a cover for corruption, the growing middle and upper classes, along with the military, resented the government’s populist endeavors. Looking down on poor Thais, they expressed little concern over poverty and ignored the political potential in improving the lives of the poor.

Ever since the 2006 coup, Thai politics have been in chaos. The military government did little to stabilize the situation in the months after the coup, proving incompetent in governance. Although the military pushed through a new constitution and banned Thaksin’s political party, it proved unable to establish itself as a legitimate governing force. Under a new name, Thaksin’s reconstructed party, the PPP, won in the December 2007 elections designed to give democratic legitimacy to the coup’s supporters.

The Thai Constitutional Court then threw consecutive PPP prime ministers out of office in late 2008 and banned all PPP leaders from politics for the next five years. The opposition leader, Abhisit Vejjajiva, then took over as Prime Minister. PPP supporters then took to the streets. Throughout 2010, tensions have risen, with red shirts pouring into Bangkok from the rural north, leading to the violence of recent days.

This situation lends itself to reading the tea leaves about Thailand’s future. King Rama IX is 82 years old and in poor health. A man of conservative tendencies, the King is revered as a deity in Thailand. He has intervened in politics before, helping to restore peace to the nation’s fragile democracy. But he has remained silent in the current crisis. The military and its elite supporters claim to work in the King’s interests, though it’s impossible to know to what extent this is official royal approval.

Perhaps more important, the Crown Prince may be making his wishes felt. Well-known as an admirer of a military-dominated state and uncomfortable with democracy, he may be providing active support to the military. Although the King is largely seen as above politics and therefore does not play a day-to-day role, providing official support of the military will likely embolden its attacks on the democratic process.

While Southeast Asia is not as central to American foreign policy as it was forty years ago, America’s relationship with Thailand remains key to its interests in the area. At least publicly, the Obama administration has taken a fairly hands-off approach to the Thai situation, at least in comparison with the Honduran coup of 2009, which became a minor political issue in the U.S.

The United Nations has offered to mediate the situation, but the Thai government has rejected this. The government claims it doesn’t want to give legitimacy to the red-shirts, but of course, the government itself came to power through non-democratic means. It’s hard to say what leverage either the U.S. or the U.N. have in this situation and I believe violence will continue to mount.

William Barnes, writing at Asia Times Online, noted on May 13 that Maoist tactics are playing an increasing role in red shirt strategies. Were a large number of Thais to commit themselves to violent revolution, the situation could devolve into a more geopolitically important version of Nepal, which only recently ended its long and brutal civil war between the military and Maoist guerillas.

While we should condemn Maoist-inspired violence, it represents the desperation and poverty of rural Thais. They gave democracy a chance. They elected their leaders repeatedly and just as often their opponents threw their leaders out using non-democratic means. Unless the Thai military and middle-class accept democracy, understanding that they have to live with results they don’t like and that they will have to appeal to a majority of Thais in order to win power, political and social instability will result.

As the Thai elites have shown no inclination to respect democracy, I fear civil war will result that could lead to the destabilization of much of Southeast Asia.