While the world awaits Ukraine’s spring or summer counteroffensive against the Russian forces in the southeast of the war-torn country, Moscow, Kyiv and the West seem to be preparing the ground for potential ceasefire talks. That, however, does not mean that the conflict in the Eastern European nation will end anytime soon.
The war in Ukraine is unlikely to end unless one of the two parties involved agrees to sign a de facto capitulation. Even though the Kremlin has been desperately trying to reach an agreement with Ukraine for more than a year, chances for Western-backed Kyiv to sign a deal that will recognize Russia’s gains remain rather minimal.
However, if Ukraine, in the next few months, does not manage to recapture significant portions of territory in the southeast and suffers heavy casualties during its counteroffensive, it may lose the initiative on the battlefield. But given that Russia does not have capacity to launch any large-scale military operations – but continues focusing on capturing strategically unimportant towns in the Donbass – the Kremlin, regardless of the outcome of Ukraine’s campaign, may agree to hold ceasefire talks with Kyiv.
In other words, unable to retake the initiative from Ukraine and seize more territory, Russia will likely seek to reach a deal with the Ukrainian authorities. At this point, it remains highly uncertain if Kyiv – in case its counteroffensive does not result in territorial gains – will agree to hold talks with Moscow. Ukraine’s leaders have repeatedly stated that they do not plan to negotiate with Russia as long as Vladimir Putin is in charge in the Kremlin. But a potential, although not very probable, Ukrainian fiasco on the battleground could force Kyiv to sign a ceasefire deal not directly with Putin, but with some other Russian political, or possibly even military figure.
Such an agreement, however, would not end the hostilities in the Eastern European country, but it would certainly give Ukraine time to prepare for another round of fighting, just like the Minsk Agreements signed in 2014 and 2015 allowed Kyiv to prepare for the Russian invasion in 2022. Meanwhile, the world public opinion would focus on other potential conflicts, be it in Taiwan, South Caucasus, or some other hot spot.
But what if Ukraine, armed by the United States and its allies, manages to seize parts of the Zaporizhzhia, Kerson, or Donetsk regions? Putin’s recent visit to the Kherson region, where he met with the Russian military officials, indicates that Moscow will face some serious internal divisions if it suffers another debacle in Ukraine. As a result, the Kremlin will undoubtedly be under pressure at home to raise the stakes.
Following Russia’s defeats in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions in 2022, Russia launched a missile campaign against Ukraine’s energy facilities. It was a typical Kremlin-style half-measure, whose goal was not to destroy Ukraine energy infrastructure, but to show to the Russian public that Moscow is determined to “fight seriously”. In reality, in April 2023, Ukraine has resumed electricity exports, which means that Russian missile strikes did not have a significant impact on the country’s energy sector.
Thus, if Russia, as a result of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, suffers another humiliating defeat, the Kremlin will have two options: to immediately initiate ceasefire talks, or to announce another partial mobilization. There is no doubt that certain groups in the Russian elite would undoubtedly prefer to sign a ceasefire deal under any conditions. The Kremlin propagandist could always portray such an action as a “geopolitical victory”. The Wagner Group frontman Yevgeny Prigozhin has already called on Putin to end the so-called special military operation in Ukraine and tell the world Russia has won “by destroying a large part of the Ukrainian male population and grabbing territory.” It is, however, unclear if Russian public opinion, weary of “goodwill gestures”, “difficult decisions” and “strategic regroupings”, would buy such a propaganda narrative.
If Russia loses more territory in Ukraine, policy makers in the Kremlin might be under pressure to “do something” in order to prevent a collapse of Putin’s “special military operation”. As a result, the Russian leader can declare either another partial mobilization, or – if Ukrainian troops manage to reach Crimea – the state of war and a total mobilization. Given that Russian society still does not seem ready for a de facto surrender, the Kremlin will likely seek to continue Putin’s adventure in Ukraine. It is, therefore, not surprising that the upper house of Russia’s parliament has recently approved a bill that would allow authorities to issue electronic summonses to draftees and reservists. Such a move seems to be part of preparations for an escalation of the Ukraine war.
For the time being, the West will continue supplying the Ukrainian Armed Forces with weapons, and training its troops for fierce battles that are expected to take place in the near future. When exactly Ukraine will launch large-scale attacks against the Russian forces – nobody can tell. However, it is entirely possible that Kyiv may decide to “spoil” Russia’s celebration of the Victory Day Parade on May 9. Quite aware of that, Russian authorities in several regions near Ukraine have canceled the annual May 9 parade, which indicates that they are taking the situation seriously.
One thing is for sure: whenever the Ukrainian counteroffensive takes place, it will represent a major moment in the war. Stay tuned.
Image: Graffiti reading “Putin is war”, Petrozavodsk, 2023, by Нагласакс
