A one-page document submitted by Prime Minister Netanyahu to his cabinet in February provides no answers to the question of when Israel would consider its military objectives in Gaza met. It does, however, shed light on the thinking of the Israeli prime minister about the future of Gaza once those elusive objectives have been met.
The plan foresees a long-term involvement of Israel in Gaza and makes no mention of a role for the Palestinians in governing Gaza, including the Palestinian Authority. It also includes a reinstatement of the crippling blockade and a security buffer zone that further shrinks Gaza’s territory. All these are in direct contradiction to stated US objectives for the future of Gaza.
The US position in the region has taken a significant, perhaps irreparable, hit. More hopeful US officials seem to believe that it is a passing phenomenon, that anger towards the US will eventually subside as it has done in the past. Other officials seem to recognize a major change has taken place in the region; that the US has lost the region’s political elites, at least those who had subscribed to the belief of a Western-oriented liberal global order that now appears to no longer exist, or perhaps never existed in the first place. Those elites seem to have concluded that they’ve been duped all along with never-ending talk about a two-state solution, regional peace and a whole host of other US-promoted universal values, including human rights.
Should the US want to do something to salvage this, some gesture towards the Palestinians can be expected. It can come in the form of additional lip service by protesting Netanyahu’s plan, similar to that which has been espoused by countless US administrations during his long tenure. Alternatively, it could be a grand gesture such as recognizing a Palestinian state or putting a specific deadline to the end of the occupation. Although significant, these, too, may also be insufficient if they remain in the realm of goodwill and be impossible to implement.
Skeptics in the region have long suggested that the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians has been a lot more process than it has been peace, that it has effectively trapped the Arab world and the Palestinians in an open-ended process that only served to keep them at bay with the promise of a future that never materialized.
The US is either in on this or is also being taken for a ride.
Over the years of his on-again off-again tenure, Netanyahu has regularly acted with impunity towards the US and disregarded US interests. The US appears to have tolerated this for one of three reasons. He is the master manipulator of domestic US politics that people claim him to be. Alternately, they have been fully onboard with him all along but want to give the impression that he is uncontrollable, would not bow to pressure and can act independently or in contradiction of US interests. Finally, perhaps the US has become concerned with political stability in Israel to the extent that they do not see any viable alternative to him and are willing to bank on him despite his shortcomings.
Ultimately, it doesn’t much matter; the outcome is the same for the Palestinians and the region.
If the US is indeed in cahoots with Netanyahu, it should nonetheless be concerned that his Gaza plan is a continuation, if not a doubling down, of an already failed strategy. The idea that Israel’s technological and military power can perpetuate the status quo indefinitely sounds appealing to Netanyahu’s ethnonationalist supporters and those outside Israel who admire its homeland security approach of governing others. Yet, it is a strategy that has failed time and time again.
Notwithstanding the enormous differences between the context of US and Israeli military experiences, the US experience in Afghanistan proved that victory is not possible when there is no concerted effort to embed military gains in a larger strategic context and when there is no political space to suggest that the total defeat and elimination of your opponent’s ideology is not possible.
US decision makers and strategists have some difficult decisions ahead of them. The first is to decide whether their strategic interests are tied to the political prospects of Netanyahu or their strategic relationship with Israel. The second is to determine whether the state of their country’s regional position matters to begin with, especially if the US is indeed pivoting away from the Middle East.
If it does matter, it begs the question: what can be done to salvage it?
Image credits: The White House and Office of Congressman Mike Johnson
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