While all eyes are on Ukraine, Turkey is preparing to reinvade Syria. Given that Moscow – the major ally of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad – is still preoccupied with the war in the Eastern European country, the Kremlin’s room for political maneuvers is rather limited, which means that it might have to make significant concessions to Ankara.
Although reports on the ground suggest that Turkey is arming and training its proxies in northern Syria to seize the towns of Tel Rifaat, Kobani, Ain Issa and potentially Manbij, at this point there are no indications that the Turkish army and its allies will launch a “special military operation” in the near future. However, if Ankara gets the green light from the United States, it will not take too much time for its troops to prepare for another “short victorious war” that would allow Turkey to create a 30-kilometre-deep buffer zone across its border with Syria.
Presently, the US opposes Ankara’s plans, claiming that it is ISIS is that would take advantage of a potential Turkish military campaign. Washington, however, “recognizes Turkey’s legitimate security concerns on its border”, which means that there is still room for the two NATO allies to make a deal on the future of northern Syria.
The problem, however, is that Russia has deployed its troops to the region. That is why the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has recently called on Russia, as well as Iran – another Assad ally – to help prevent Turkey from launching a military offensive against its positions in northern Syria. Ankara, for its part, sees the Kurdish forces in Syria as an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and aims to neutralize them. In order to preserve the status quo on the ground, the Kurds reportedly seek to strengthen ties with Russian-backed Assad, as well as with Iran. But are Moscow and Tehran really interested in protecting the SDF?
Over recent years, the Syrian Kurds were the weakest link in the lucrative Russo-Turkish deals. On July 19, during the summit in Tehran, leaders of Russia, Turkey, and Iran reportedly discussed the fate of the Kurdish-controlled regions in the north of Syria. The coming weeks and months will show if the final deal has been made. But even if Moscow and Tehran eventually approve a Turkish “special military operation” against the Kurdish forces, it remains rather questionable whether Ankara will be willing to engage in another Syrian adventure without at least tacit approval from Washington.
War-torn Syria is a de facto failed state, where foreign powers have their own occupation zones. Russia, through Assad’s Syrian Arab Army, controls around 60 percent of the country. In regions that are under Assad and Russia’s control, Iranian proxy groups have established their presence, given that Iran is using Syria as a base to transport weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Turkey, through its proxies – namely the Syrian National Army – controls large portions of Idlib, as well as neighboring areas in the north of the country, while the United States, through the SDF, controls the oil-rich eastern parts of Syria.
There is no doubt that the leaders of Russia, Turkey and Iran tried to coordinate their views on Syria during the Tehran summit. But given that their interests in the Middle Eastern nation are diametrically opposed, it is not very likely that the three countries will manage to reach a lasting deal on Syria. That, however, does not mean that Moscow, Ankara and Tehran will not attempt to make a deal on other geopolitical issues.
For instance, the United States claims that Russia is seeking to purchase weapons-capable drones from Iran. Even though both Moscow and Tehran have been under Western sanctions for years, the Islamic Republic, unlike Russia, developed quite successful combat drones. They proved to be very efficient in Syria and Yemen. But is Iran willing to sell them to the Russian Federation?
Russia has traditionally used the Islamic Republic as a bargaining chip with the West. Now that the Kremlin is isolated in the global arena, Iran could use the same strategy vis-à-vis Moscow, and attempt to improve ties with the United States and its allies. At the same time, Tehran will likely try to take advantage of Russia’s war in Ukraine and additionally increase its influence in Syria.
Turkey, on the other hand, is expected to continue attempting to portray itself as a mediator in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. If Moscow and Kyiv sign a deal that would allow Ukraine to freely export grains via its Black Sea ports, Ankara will almost certainly become a “supervisor” that will “inspect the ships involved in the transportation of grains to exclude weapons smuggling.” Moreover, Russia’s debacle in Ukraine has provided Turkey with significant leverage over Moscow in Syria, which means that it will not be difficult for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to get approval from his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin for the attack on the Kurdish-controlled territory in northern Syria.
Thus, unless the United States prevents Ankara from launching a “special military operation”, the Kurds of northern Syria will yet again be the biggest victims of the Russo-Turkish geopolitical deals.
Image: US Department of State
