There was much celebrating yesterday as rebel forces, aided by increased NATO surveillance, moved into Tripoli. Though fighting continues in pockets throughout Tripoli—most notably over Gaddafi’s compound—the regime’s end is imminent and all but certain. Though Gaddafi’s whereabouts remain unknown, his two eldest sons, Mohammad and Saif al-Islam, have been taken into custody by rebel forces.
A few hours ago, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, Chairman of the Libyan National Transition Council, acknowledged the significance of the revolution’s early peaceful protesters. He warned against vigilante acts of justice and called for a peaceful transition, demanding that Gaddafi be captured alive and unharmed to be tried in Libyan courts. In a nod to Gaddafi’s history of interventionism in sub-Saharan Africa, he noted that Gaddafi would be remembered for the atrocities he committed against both the people of Libya and the world. Abdel Jilal promised that the end of the regime marked Libya’s emergence as a responsible member of the international community and closed by noting that the move into Tripoli represents a culmination of decades-long Libyan resistance against Gaddafi. Libyans, he said, “never submitted” to Gaddafi’s rule.
The National Transition Council may be a better mechanism for transition than the military-influenced transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. The Council arguably represents a cross-section of Libyan society. As we are seeing in Egypt, militaries are not often good mechanisms of democratic transition. Though they can enforce order and the rule of law, they tend to protect their own interests at the expense of democratic reform. The National Transition Council, though comprised of elites, was not an already-existing institution with money and power interests entrenched in Libyan society. But because they do not have the resources to enforce law and order, they have to rely on the good graces of rebel factions; this means immediate risks of chaos and violence but may ultimately result in more comprehensive regime overhaul.
There is evidence that citizens have in many ways taken the Council’s advice to heart, forming citizen councils to clean the streets and guard against looting. Last night’s celebrations have largely turned to outpourings of civic engagement as local groups set up neighborhood watches in attempts to fend off violence and mitigate the damage wrought by Gaddafi’s last stand. It is impossible to judge what kind of nation-wide impact these groups will have, though this early ethos of cooperation and solidarity is promising as Libya moves forward.
But this is not going to be an easy or simplistic transition. Rebel forces are hoping for NATO reinforcements tonight as they plan for the final battles against Gaddafi. Even so, this is an alliance that has been replete with complications from the outset. As Jonathan Steele argues in The Guardian:
It has long been apparent that [NATO’s] agenda was regime change rather than the humanitarian imperative of protecting civilians on which it based its pleas to Russia and China not to block a UN security council resolution to set up a no-fly zone in March.
Because of its role in turning the tide in Libya, Steele notes that “[NATO] and the rebels are inextricably linked.” As a result, he says, “there is a justified perception on the Arab street that the rebels are over-reliant on Western support and that the overriding Western motive is access to Libya’s oil.” Since people throughout the Middle East—and in Libya—are cynical about Western, and especially US, interventionism, the rebels will continue to be met with a degree of skepticism not seen in the immediate aftermath of Mubarak’s fall, or Ben Ali’s.
Steele is right to point out that:
The risk of score-settling and unjustified reprisals against members of Gaddafi’s tribe will be high. They may also be excluded unfairly from the new dispensation as it moves towards a decent constitution and elections. So far the rebels’ actions have been correct and balanced. They have not tortured or assassinated Gaddafi’s two captured sons. Calling on their own supporters to show restraint, their leaders are pledging that the new regime will be inclusive.
Though he says the “real test will come in the next few weeks, when the international spotlight is off,” this is a promising start. There are always risks when the people in charge have limited power and much to prove, but these may be useful conditions when it comes to meaningful democratic state-building in the Middle East. A cynical but engaged public is the best kind of public to have when it comes to maintaining government accountability since the public—as well as other Middle Eastern states—will demand that the new government prove its legitimacy as well as its sovereignty.
Meanwhile, analysts are nervous about the possible emergence of infighting between rivaling factions throughout the country. Power grabs and fierce competition would certainly undermine the democratic reform process in Libya, but The Guardian’s Brian Whitaker writes that “many Libyans insist that the social divisions are nowhere near as deep as in Iraq.” Likewise, he notes, these factions “are less likely to become a proxy battleground for foreign powers.” Though foreign powers are clearly angling for influence, it is unlikely that they will invest long-term military might in propping up some rebels at the expense of others.
Also, Libya’s state infrastructure is reasonably robust—and still intact. Even under Gaddafi’s regime, Whitaker notes, Libya “ranked 111 out of 171 in the Failed States Index—closer to Finland and Norway (the least failed states) than to Somalia or Afghanistan.” This means it is unlikely that the state apparatus will collapse or that the country will devolve into a handful of semi-autonomous warring regions as in Somalia.
Libya is far more resource rich than Egypt or Tunisia, so it arguably has a better capacity for establishing robust democratic institutions. The oil reserves provide Libya a cushion with which to immediately improve the living conditions of the masses and offset the worst effects of rising food prices and unemployment. In other words, Libya is better positioned than Egypt or Tunisia to take on “the economic problems that were a major factor in the uprisings that led to the overthrow of their presidents.” Though rival factions and NATO posturing may compromise these efforts, Libya’s relative wealth at least gives transition leaders the material means to establish legitimacy. Though oil reserves are not generally a boon to democracy and reform, the Council’s interest in proving itself to citizens is reason for optimism.
If the case of Libya has any lesson for the international community, it’s that political developments are influenced by historical contexts too complex for inane generalizations about an “Arab Spring” to make any sense. The weakness of the National Transition Council is the revolution’s greatest risk—and also its biggest hope. Some corruption and chaos are probably par for the course, at least for the next several months. Still, Whitaker hopefully reminds us that “the destruction of Gaddafi’s army does at least open up the possibility of politicians, rather than the military, gaining the upper hand.” If there is any truism worth heeding in the realm of international politics, it is that military rule is almost always antithetical to democratic governance.
In spite of NATO involvement and the reservations of the Arab world, this newly opened political space is good reason for cautious optimism as Tripoli falls. Without a military regime set to assume control, there is room for the development of strong democratic institutions and real reform.
If the National Transition Council can prioritize the demands of Libyan citizens and deploy the country’s oil wealth in an equitable fashion, it may transcend some of the difficulties that other reformers face in the Middle East to create the kind of lasting change that for which protesters throughout the region are fighting.